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a b s t r a c t
In the neo-liberal climate of reduced responsibility for the state, alongside global platforms established to
implement the Hyogo Framework for Action, a new arena opens for a multitude of stakeholders to engage
in disaster risk reduction (DRR). The key role that the state can play in instituting effective DRR tends to
receive little attention, yet in situations where the state apparatus is weak, such as in Nepal, it becomes
evident that integrating DRR into development is a particularly challenging task. Due to the political sit-
uation in Nepal, progress has been stalled in providing a legislative context conducive to effective DRR.
This paper traces the evolution of key DRR initiatives that have been developed in spite of the challenging
governance context, such as the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management and the Nepal Risk
Reduction Consortium. Informed by in-depth interviews with key informants, the argument is made that
the dedicated efforts of national and international non-governmental organisations, multilateral agencies
and donors in mainstreaming DRR demonstrate that considerable progress can be made even where gov-
ernment departments are protective of their own interests and are slow to enact policies to support DRR.
The paper suggests however, that without stronger engagement of key political actors the prospects for
further progress in DRR may be limited. The findings have implications for other post-conflict countries
or weak states engaging in DRR.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Introduction
It is evident that some governments have successfully adopted
and implemented disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies, while
others lag behind (Williams, 2011). The shortcomings in DRR
are increasingly being regarded as a consequence of weak gover-
nance and lack of political will (Williams, 2011). Despite this, in
the academic literature, little attention has been given to the pro-
cesses of governance of DRR, such as the formulation of policy
and the roles of different stakeholders. In addition there is a lack
of evidence on the effectiveness of different governance systems
(UNISDR, 2011). Ojha et al. (2009: 365) suggest that effective gov-
ernance is particularly hindered by the complex interplay of
power and knowledge among diverse groups of actors with
unequal command over resources. In DRR, this complex interplay
of power and knowledge among diverse stakeholder groups
gives rise to different governance approaches. As a post-conflict
country in the early stages of democracy with a weak system of
governance, Nepal offers an interesting case study on DRR imple-
mentation. This paper aims to explore in depth, the governance
struggles and policy processes in this post-conflict state in which
numerous stakeholders are emerging to fill the ‘gap’ left by weak
government apparatus.
A brief theoretical discussion on governance is presented
below, followed by an account of the global context of DRR.
Nepal’s disaster, political and social context is then introduced
and the methodology for the research undertaken is outlined.
Drawing on key informant interviews, the discussion provides a
critical overview of the policy processes and the governance of
DRR. The conclusion reflects on the implications of the research
for other post-conflict states and states where government
responsibility is reducing as part of a neo-liberal agenda.
Governance
‘Governance’ refers to the actors, structures and processes by
which societies share power and make collectively binding
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decisions (van Asselt and Renn, 2011: 431; Lebel et al., 2006:
2).1 According to Goodwin (1998) adopting a ‘governance per-
spective’ entails giving attention to the distribution of political
power both internal and external to the state. The distribution
of power between state and non-state actors has changed signif-
icantly over the last twenty years, as a consequence of neoliberal
economic and political restructuring. This is often referred to as
the shift from ‘government to governance’. Before discussing the
nature of this shift further a brief introduction to neoliberalism
is presented.
Neoliberalism and the redistribution of state functions
Neoliberalism has a complex history and has been ascribed dif-
ferent meanings by rival groups of political economists throughout
the 20th century (Gane, 2012).2 In a broad sense, it involves a
(re)negotiation of the boundaries between the market, the state,
and civil society so that more areas of people’s lives are governed
by an economic logic, as the market is regarded to be the best mech-
anism for allocating goods and services to meet the diverse needs of
actors across the globe (Castree, 2008). A popular notion of neoliber-
alism is that it is a laissez-faire political and economic culture which
demands government and the state to be limited in their power to
intervene in the market or in the entrepreneurial activities of indi-
viduals (Gane, 2012).3 Castree (2008) refers to neoliberalism as
‘‘the fetishising of markets as forms of social organization’’.4 One of
the processes popularly associated with neoliberalisation is deregu-
lation. This entails the scaling back of states and their capacity to
regulate (Igoe and Brockington, 2007) and interfere in areas of social
and environmental life (Castree, 2008), as well as the rolling back of
redistributive reforms of the mid-twentieth century that were
implemented in most advanced industrial economies (Castree,
2008 citing Harvey, 1989). This has resulted in an ‘off-loading’ of
responsibilities to the private sector and/or civil society groups
(Castree, 2008).
For Bulkeley and Jordan (2012) the ‘hollowing out’ or ‘rolling
back’ of the nation state has given rise to a situation whereby its
functions are redistributed ‘upwards’ to international institutions,
‘downwards’ to regional and local tiers of authority [decentralisa-
tion],5 and ‘outwards’ to a range of non-state actors. Thus, state
boundaries have become more politically and economically perme-
able to decisions and flows emanating from diverse, overlapping
and integrated networks of power which operate beyond effective
control by formal structures of government (Bulkeley and Jordan,
2012; Goodwin, 1998). The messiness and scope of this complexity
raises questions concerning legitimacy and power (Goodwin, 1998)
which have implications for DRR governance.
NGOs and the ‘outwards’ redistribution of ‘state’ functions
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have found a new
place within the neoliberal global order in terms of the ‘outwards’
redistribution of state functions (Frewer, 2013).6 NGOs are an
extremely diverse group of independent organisations that are nei-
ther run by government nor driven by profit (Lewis and Kanji,
2009).7 Poorer countries receiving official development assistance
have seen an increased proportion of aid being channelled to and
through NGOs (Suleiman, 2013, citing Edwards and Hulme, 1996;
Wallace et al., 1997) as part of the shift from government to gover-
nance, meaning not only have they proliferated in number, but their
relative position has increased in relation to the state (Bebbington,
2005).8 Lewis and Kanji (2009: 5) attribute the rise of the NGO
against the ascendancy of the neoliberal policy agendas to their high
degree of flexibility in institutional form and the wide spectrum of
values. International donors have tended to view national and inter-
national NGOs as being more efficient than governmental actors as:
they tend to work at the grassroots level with poorer and more mar-
ginalised groups adopting participatory approaches; they have prin-
cipled motivations, clear mission and objectives, progressive
development agendas and lower overhead costs (Suleiman, 2013;
Davis and Murdie, 2012; Benson et al., 2001; Hulme and Edwards,
1997; Lewis and Kanji, 2009). NGOs are often seen as synonymous
with, or representative of, ‘civil society’, acting as a pluralist counter-
weight to state power (Frewer, 2013; Benson et al., 2001).
However, the enthusiasm towards NGOs as a vehicle for devel-
opment has for a long time been under scrutiny within academia
(Frewer, 2013). NGOs tend to reflect and reproduce both the hier-
archies of the societies in which they are embedded, such as neo-
patrimonial networks, clientelism, corruption and inequality
(Frewer, 2013; Suleiman, 2013; O’Reilly, 2010). Thus where the
legitimacy of poor country governments is questionable, their civil
societies may be equally disenfranchised, deeply divided, and ill
1 ‘Governance’ is used in both a descriptive and a normative sense (Renn et al.,
2011). In a descriptive sense, it refers to the complex web of manifold interactions
between heterogeneous actors pertaining to a particular policy domain (Renn et al.,
2011). In a normative sense, ‘good governance’ is an umbrella term for any package of
public sector reforms or actions in civil society designed to create lasting and positive
changes in accordance with the principles of: participation, representation, deliber-
ation, accountability, empowerment, predictability, coherence, social justice, and
organisation features (Renn et al., 2011; Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006; Lebel et al.,
2006). Good governance in the context of disaster risk reduction includes the
adoption and promotion of robust and sound policies, legislation, coordination
mechanisms and regulatory frameworks, and the creation of an enabling environment
that is characterized by appropriate decision making processes to allow effective
participation of stakeholders, complemented by the appropriate allocation of
resources (WMO, 2012).
2 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider these in depth (see Peck, 2008, for
such as discussion – cited by Gane, 2012).
3 According to Medina (2010), a neoliberal rationality of government departs from
classical liberalism on two key points. First, rather than proposing that the state limit
its interventions into markets, neoliberalism proposes that the market form itself
should serve as ‘‘the organizational principle for the state’’ (citing Lemke, 2001:200).
In a more Foucauldain reading of neoliberal ideology, neoliberalism addresses the
appropriate powers of the state and the role it should play in ensuring the freedom of
the market (Gane, 2012) which may entail ‘‘a constant push to define and regulate
social life through principles that come from the market’’ (Gane, 2012). Many
conceive of neoliberalism then, as a reorganisation of the role and practices of the
state in relation to the economy, not a decline in state power (MacNeil and Paterson,
2012).
4 Castree (2008) highlights ‘ideal-type characterisations’ of neoliberalism as
including privatization, marketisation, degregulation, re-regulation and the creation
of market proxies. Of most relevance to this paper is the characterisation he refers to
as ‘‘the construction of flanking mechanisms in civil society’’ which relates to the
encouragement of charities, NGOs, ‘communities’ etc to provide services that
interventionist states have provided in the past.
5 This is not considered in depth as it is beyond the scope of this paper but is
intended to form the basis of future work.
6 A considerable proportion of donor funding now by-passes the state. Multilateral
aid (channelled for example to the UN) stands at around 30% of official development
assistance (OECD, 2010). It is argued that multilateral aid may be more effective than
bilateral aid due to economies of scale, political neutrality and legitimacy, large scale
of capital and knowledge resources, lower unit costs, and the provision of public
goods. On the other hand institutional complexity, procedures which can be
cumbersome or time-consuming, lack of transparency, higher absolute costs and
salaries, remoteness and lack of accountability characterise multilateral institutions
(OECD, 2010).
7 NGOs play very different roles and take different shapes and forms within and
across different country contexts. In terms of structure, NGOs may be large or small
formal or informal, flexible or bureaucratic. In terms of values, NGOs may be secular
or faith based, vehicles for progressive change or may be regarded as part of market
solutions to policy problems. They may play roles as implementers (goods and
services, delivery role, contracted to provide specific tasks); catalysts (inspire,
facilitate or contribute to promote change – lobbying, advocacy, research, policy
influence) and partners (with government, donors, private sector, building capacity)
(Lewis and Kanji, 2009).
8 In line with the neo-liberal agenda, there has been an increase in bilateral funding
through NGOs and national multilateral agencies (such as the UN operating in specific
countries) thereby decreasing direct funding to the state. For example, the funds that
have been delivered through national multilateral agencies and NGOs rose from 30%
in 2007/8 to 51% in 2011/12 (UKAid, 2012). This has led to a proliferation of
stakeholders engaged in DRR.
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equipped to participate effectively in politics (Grindle, 2004). Fur-
thermore, NGOs have been criticised for: functioning in a similar
way to businesses to compete for financial support from donors;
facilitating neo-liberal policy change (or at least being co-opted
to serve hegemonic development agendas); being more account-
able to donors (upwards accountability) than ‘civil society’; being
self-interested or based on family associations; lacking coordina-
tion and generating fragmentation and duplication; and their eco-
nomic dependence on external funding which has sustainability
implications (Ebrahim, 2003; Lewis and Kanji, 2009; Suleiman,
2013; Townsend et al., 2004; Booth, 2011).
Transnational networks and the ‘upwards’ redistribution of ‘state’
functions
At the same time as there has been a redistribution of state
functions ‘outwards’ to non-government actors, there has also
been an expanding influence from ‘beyond the state’ (or ‘upwards’)
through transnational networks of actors and institutions (Betsill
and Bulkeley, 2004). These networks (such as global platforms in
the case of DRR) mobilize information, knowledge, and values with
the objective of integrating new conceptions of (environmental)
phenomena into everyday worldviews and practices of private
and public actors (Lipschutz, 1997:443 cited by Betsill and
Bulkeley, 2004). These ‘networks’ can influence the direction of
donor funding and approaches taken by multi-lateral agencies
(such as promoting the principles in the Hyogo Framework for
Action).
Governing beyond the state in disaster risk reduction
Authors such as Bulkeley and Jordan (2012) note that despite
the shift towards ‘governing beyond the state’ where the role of
transnational networks becomes of greater importance, it is not a
matter of ‘governing without the state’ as the state is ‘still the cen-
tre of considerable political power’ (citing Pierre and Peters, 2000:
12). Indeed, within disaster management, the role of the state is
seen as critical. Christoplos et al. (2001: 187), for example, regard
governments and local institutions to be the most important set
of actors in disaster management. Yet DRR, as the following section
illustrates, is very much a global agenda which is being driven in
poorer countries by international organisations such as the UN
and funded by donors.9 While donor support may be very valuable
in areas such as disaster management where state expertise may be
lacking or capacity is weak (Rajan, 2002) it may also simultaneously
present a challenge for government ‘ownership’,10 as there may be a
‘latent’ power evident in the way donor partners prioritise global
agendas (Hyden, 2008). Thus, paradoxically, according to Berg
(1993, cited by Godfrey et al., 2002) the donor or supply driven nat-
ure of technical assistance can actually lead to: weak local owner-
ship and hence limited commitment; disorderly decision making;
deepening dependence on foreign experts and weakening rather
than building local institutions and capacities, exacerbating the ten-
dencies of neoliberalism towards weakening the state.
Neoliberalism and the role of donors in development in weak states11
An underlying rationale for the imposition of the neoliberal
project on poor countries may be based on the assumption that
corrupt and inefficient states restrict economic growth, so that
if states were less intrusive, people’s lives would naturally
improve (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Yet as Mosse (2013:
236) notes, in the age of neo-liberal reform, the terms weak state,
fragile12 state, crisis state and collapsed state are especially prom-
inent in the development policy lexicon. While not explicitly high-
lighting the mechanisms underlying such a connection, he argues
that the preferred solutions to the question of how market-led
development was to be governed in poor countries with weak
states, was through the donor coordination (of regulatory institu-
tions, decentralisation, democratic process). The capacity of weak
states to make effective use of aid has been questioned however,
and is a contentious issue. Grindle (2011) suggests that strengthen-
ing non-governmental forms of governance makes sense for failed
or collapsed states as there is very little upon which to build, but
weakly institutionalized states have more upon which to build and
strengthening government structures may best serve as sites for
intervention.13
This paper, then, examines in detail the tensions that arise
between the need for strong centralised state support for, and
expertise in, DRR and disaster management and the neo-liberal
agenda which has ‘hollowed out’ the state. This research aims to
explore the extent to which a shift from ‘government’ to ‘gover-
nance’ is evident in the DRR process and the degree to which such
a shift may constitute power-sharing between the state and the
multitude of other stakeholders emerging on the DRR stage. The
role of international organisations and donors in advancing
the DRR agenda is examined along with the implications
that this may have for state ‘ownership’ over the DRR pro-
cess. The challenges and constraints to progressing the DRR agenda
in the context of a post-conflict state with ‘weak’ governance
are also explored. The following section discusses the broader
international agenda and transnational networks driving DRR
processes.
Disaster risk reduction, governance and the international agenda
Disaster management frameworks such as the Hyogo Frame-
work for Action (HFA) 2005–2015 have played an important role
9 National policies in turn are often influenced by such international policy
concerns and funding (Ensor et al., 2009) particularly in less ‘traditional’ sectors such
as environmental governance (Persson, 2009) and disaster management. This is
particularly the case in areas such as international environmental governance
(Persson, 2009) and disaster management but perhaps less so in the more traditional
welfare sectors (for example Ensor et al.’s (2009) work on policy implementation in
the health sector in Nepal suggests it was more domestically led than donor led).
Persson (2009 citing Laugen and Lunde, 1994) argues that the proliferation of
overseas development assistance policy goals in the 1980s and 1990s (poverty,
reduction, gender, environment and to this list can be added disaster risk reduction)
result in a cognitive burden and ‘mainstreaming fatigue’. With respect to environ-
mental policy, mainstreaming (for which there are many parallels with DRR), Persson
(2009) notes that the process is hampered by lack of recipient country institutional
capacity, weak environmental ministries and a lack of commitment in the face of
other development priorities.
10 Recipient governments can be said to ‘own’ an aid activity when they believe it
empowers them and serves their interests (Godfrey et al., 2002:357, citing van de
Walle and Johnston, 1996).
11 It is relevant to note that the concept of a ‘weak state’ has been challenged.
Gainsborough (2010) for example notes that states can be ‘strong and weak
depending on where and how we look’. They may exhibit gaps in security,
performance and legitimacy, but still be capable of repression and authoritarianism
(GSDRC, 2013). Furthermore in the absence of a formal state, informal forms of
security, governance and order, may emerge (GSDRC, 2013).
12 OECD’s definition of fragile state is a state with weak capacity to carry out the
basic state functions of governing a population and its territory and that lacks the
ability or political will to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations
with society (OECD, 2013). According to the World Bank, ‘‘Fragile states’’ is the term
used for countries facing particularly severe development challenges: weak institu-
tional capacity, poor governance, and political instability (World Bank, 2013a). The
World Bank’s definition of fragile states covers low-income countries scoring 3.2 and
below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). Nepal falls just
outside this category with a score of 3.28 (World Bank, 2013b).
13 The state of knowledge and practice regarding the establishment of effective
governance mechanisms in post-conflict countries is still in its infancy (Brinkerhoff,
2005), but the relative importance of the state vis-à-vis NGOs in rebuilding
legitimacy, security and effectiveness and the influence of external donors over such
processes are key areas of interest (Rondinelli and Montgomery, 2005).
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in advancing the agenda for DRR (Djalante et al., 2012).14 The HFA
was adopted by 168 countries (including Nepal) and supports the
efforts of nations and communities to become more resilient to,
and cope better with, the hazards that threaten their development
gains. The HFA recognises that sustainable development, poverty
reduction, good governance and DRR are mutually supportive objec-
tives (UNISDR, 2007a) and sets out a number of goals and priorities,
summarized in Table 1.
DRR governance, upon which this paper focuses, relates to HFA
Priority 1, which is concerned with, in particular, institutional and
legal frameworks for DRR, and resource availability. Central to this
is the establishment at global, regional and national levels of what
are commonly known as ‘platforms’. These platforms bring
together the stakeholders (both government and non-government)
engaged in DRR to share knowledge, experience and expertise.
National Platforms are nationally owned and led, and ‘‘aim to con-
tribute to the establishment and development of a comprehensive
national DRR system as appropriate to each country’’ (UNISDR,
2007b: 4). The HFA promotes decentralization to the sub-national
level to the provincial, district and ward level; while the National
Platform feeds ‘‘upwards’’ into the Regional and Global Platforms.
For Gaillard and Mercer (2012: 94), the HFA is ‘‘a non-binding
treaty with no concrete targets. . ..too vague to entail concrete out-
comes at the national level’’, a sentiment shared by others (see, for
example, Lavell and Maskrey, 2013). The UNISDR’s bi-annual
Global Assessment Reports (2009, 2011 and 2013) share the find-
ings of individual countries’ self-reporting against a series of core
indicators. While countries have reported significant progress
against Priority 1 through the establishment of national policies,
legal frameworks and coordination mechanisms (UNISDR, 2013),
it was recognised by a number of reporting countries that having
these frameworks in place does not necessarily translate into effec-
tive DRR on the ground. Barriers reported by participating coun-
tries to the implementation of Priority 1 include a lack of
political will, with DRR not seen as a top priority; the struggle to
mobilise sufficient resources to support DRR at different levels;
and uneven local capacities impacting on community participation
and decentralisation (UNISDR, 2013). Similar challenges were
highlighted by Manyena et al. (2013), who reviewed disaster legis-
lation in five countries (India, South Africa, the Philippines, United
Kingdom and Zimbabwe) post-2002. For Djalante et al. (2012),
whose review focused on Indonesia, a lack of commitment from
government to mainstream DRR into broader development agen-
das was a notable impediment to implementation.
The governance and disaster context in Nepal
Located along the Himalayan Arc, Nepal is highly susceptible to
floods, landslides, glacial lake outburst floods and earthquakes
(Petley et al., 2007; Nepal Disaster Report, 2011). In addition Nepal
is classified as a low income country and a low human develop-
ment nation, ranked 157 out of 187 countries in the composite
Human Development Index (UNDP, 2013). High levels of poverty
and social inequality based on ethnic and caste-based discrimina-
tion prevail (Murshed and Gates, 2005; Von Einsiedel et al., 2012).
This combination of geophysical and social vulnerability renders
Nepal highly susceptible to a high magnitude disaster, with Kath-
mandu classified as one of the most high risk cities to earthquakes
worldwide (GeoHazards International, 2001).
Understanding the socio-cultural and political context in Nepal
provides much needed insight into the ongoing governance and
development challenges faced. Over the past six decades, Nepal
has been caught in an internal struggle for peace and development,
culminating in a decade-long Maoist insurgency between 1996 and
2006 (Von Einsiedel et al., 2012). The insurgency is argued to have
arisen from a democratic deficit after 1990 in which new leaders
failed to institutionalise democracy by promoting inclusion, repre-
sentation and responsiveness (Thapa and Sharma, 2011) and was
reinforced by ethnic and socio-economic cleavages (Bohara et al.,
2006). Despite replacing its centuries-old monarchy with a federal
republic, drafting an interim constitution and holding successful
elections in 2008 – all relatively peacefully (Transparency
International, 2009), the extent to which the democratic deficit
has been addressed is questionable. According to Transparency
International (2009: 12) ‘‘[P]olitical instability, lawlessness, nepo-
tism, clientelism, and lack of accountability prevail in the society
and corruption is perceived to be a major concern’’. In 2012, the
Failed State Index, placed Nepal 27th overall and in the bottom 20
countries in terms of state delegitimisation (Fund for Peace, 2012).
Appointed following elections in 2008, the interim Maoist-led
government (or Constituent Assembly – CA) was dissolved in
May 2012 having failed to draft a new constitution during its term
of office. A caretaker government was subsequently appointed,
headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and charged with
holding new elections in 2013. In the absence of a parliament for
more than a year, the government has been only partially func-
tional. As noted by the IFRC (2011: 7), in a review of legislation
related to DRR in Nepal, ‘‘legislative reform processes have slowed
and become less clear, as has the process for implementation of
new policy’’. With a new CA elected, and in place, it is hoped that
progress will be made.
Like other conflict-affected countries, development assistance is
increasing in Nepal and now makes up about 26% of Nepal’s
national budget (MoF, 2013). In 2011–12 Nepal received develop-
ment assistance totalling $1.04 billion from over 40 donors. The
top five multi-lateral development partners include the World
Bank Group, ADB, UN Country Team, EU and the Global Fund.
The top five bilateral partners include the UK, India, Japan, Norway
and Germany (MoF, 2013). The flow of bilateral aid from DfID’s
expenditure delivered through multilateral agencies and NGOs
increased from 19% in 2007/8 to 40% in 2010/11 (UKAid, 2012);
while Pandey (2012) suggests that 30% of all donor money is chan-
nelled to NGOs. According to Yogi (2012), foreign aid has sup-
ported a rapid proliferation of local NGOs in Nepal. The number
of local, national and international NGOs in Nepal stood at 221 in
Table 1
HFA priorities and actions. Source: UNISDR (2007: 6)
Priority/theme Action
1. Governance Ensure that DRR is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation
2. Risk assessment Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning
3. Knowledge and education Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels
4. Risk management and vulnerability reduction Reduce the underlying risk factors
5. Disaster preparedness and response Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels
14 The shift from a response-led, ‘expert-outsider’ driven, top-down, technology-
centred interventionist and structural approach in disaster management to a disaster
risk reduction agenda that emphasises reducing vulnerability and building resilience
by focusing on prevention and preparedness is not considered in depth here as it is
discussed elsewhere in the literature (Maskrey, 1989; Allen, 2006; Comfort et al.,
1999; Wisner et al., 2004; Collins, 2009; Rajan, 2002; Wilkinson, 2012).
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1990 and had risen to over 30,000 by 2011 (SWC, 2011, cited by
Yogi, 2012). The latest figure available suggests nearly 40,000
NGOs are registered with the Social Welfare Council and
189 INGOs representing 25 countries (The Himalayan Times,
2014).
With such a strong reliance on overseas development assis-
tance, and in the absence of a fully functioning government,
the growing influence of donors in Nepal and the NGOs
that they support, has given rise to considerable debate within
Nepal – particularly regarding ethnic tensions that may arise
from donor support for ‘inclusive democracy’, and neo-liberal
development policies15 (Manandhar, 2013; Bhatta, 2013; Newar,
2013; IRIN, 2013).16 At the same time there has been no official
mechanism to monitor the transparency of NGOs (of which there
are 36,000 registered with the Social Welfare Council) as the anti-
corruption agency (the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse
of Authority – CIAA) currently only monitors the activities of the
government (Manandhar, 2013). In addition, the position of chief
of the CIAA and national auditor-general are still vacant after
seven years, and there is no Public Accounts Committee – a par-
liamentary body that tracks spending of donor monies (IRIN,
2013). Tighter controls have been proposed by government
authorities with the aim of ‘‘regulating the inflow of many unac-
counted billions of rupees into the country every year’’ (The
Himalayan Times, 2014). This will involve the SWC enhancing
its monitoring capacity, introducing a centralised database sys-
tem, collecting registration fees and amending the Social Welfare
Act (The Himalayan Times, 2014).
The nature of aid flows through Nepal have been largely
development rather than humanitarian oriented (Kellett and
Sparks, 2012), reflecting the fact that, unlike other countries in
the region, Nepal has not experienced a high magnitude disaster
for many decades. By comparison, in Bangladesh, which is
often cited as an exemplar for DRR governance in the develop-
ing world (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006), the high frequency of
disaster events and subsequent humanitarian assistance has
led to a transformational approach to DRR in country (UNDP,
2011).
Methodology
The findings of this paper are based primarily upon 26 qualita-
tive interviews conducted by the first and second authors in June
and September 2011 and March 2013, and a participatory work-
shop in January 2013. All stakeholders that were deemed to be
important in DRR arising from the participatory workshop were
interviewed. These included: government ministries, multi-lateral
organisations such as UNDP, international and national NGOs, and
bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors. The paper is also informed by
informal conversations, Nepali grey literature and policy docu-
ments. Questions explored the nature of the role of different stake-
holders in advancing the DRR agenda and how these have changed
over time to examine the extent to which new actors are emerging
in the DRR arena (a shift from government to governance). How
stakeholders feel about these changes (e.g. whether government
bodies felt a lack of a sense of ownership in a donor driven
agenda); who has power in governing DRR policies and practices
and the challenges of working in a post-conflict context were key
areas explored in the interviews.
Discussion
The section below presents a historical overview of disaster
management in Nepal and draws on the reflections of key infor-
mants to highlight the convoluted nature of policy processes in
the advancement of the disaster risk reduction agenda. The subse-
quent section reflects further on the dynamics of stakeholder rela-
tionships and the power struggles they entail.
Policy processes: Changes in the legislative and policy context of DRR
in Nepal
Disasters in Nepal were traditionally managed on an ad-hoc
basis and attended to as and when they occurred. In 1982 the Nat-
ural Disaster Relief Act (also known as the Natural Calamities Act)
was ratified, leading to the establishment of Central, Regional, Dis-
trict and Local Level Natural Disaster Relief Committees, as well a
system for allocating relief funds (MoHA, 1982). The Act also set
out clear organisational responsibilities, giving the Ministry of
Home Affairs (hereafter the Home Ministry) responsibility for the
formulation of national policies and their implementation; pre-
paredness and mitigation activities; immediate rescue and relief
work; data collection and dissemination; and the distribution of
disaster relief funds (Pradhan, 2007). This Act remains in place
with only minor amendments having been made since it was
passed (Aryal and Dobson, 2011).
In 1996, the Government of Nepal (GoN) produced the National
Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management (MoHA, 1996) in accor-
dance with the International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction.
This plan deals with different stages of a disaster (pre, during and
post) and was, in theory, supported by the 1999 Local Self Gover-
nance Act which advocated devolution of responsibility to lower
levels of the politico-administrative hierarchy. However, without
any guidance or specific funds provided to local government, this
had little impact (Pradhan, 2007).
In 2005, the HFA provided a much needed stimulus for change.
In 2006 two separate initiatives were instigated: the Disaster Man-
agement Policy and Act; and the National Strategy for Disaster Risk
Management (hereafter the National Strategy). Both initiatives
reflect to varying degrees the wider paradigm shift from relief
and response towards DRR and propose new institutional struc-
tures to facilitate this shift, recognising that while it is appropriate
for the Home Ministry to continue to manage response and recov-
ery efforts in the country (as they command the police and the
15 Nepal also introduced Structural Adjustment Policies in the mid 1980s. An
‘independent’ evaluation by the World Bank suggested that a dispute with India in
early 1989 disrupted trade and created losses in output (Yogi, 2012).
16 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the extent to which neoliberalism
may have weakened or contributed to the fragility of the Nepalese state. Suffice it to
say that some authors consider there to be a direct relationship between neoliber-
alism and fragility in Nepal; some consider the relationship to be more indirect; while
others would attribute the cause of fragility to more internal factors such as the
ethnic tensions discussed above. Suggesting a direct relationship between neo-
liberalism and fragility, Dahal (2012: 9), for instance, argues that Nepal’s mix of feudal
and neoliberal features into its political culture oiled by patronage ‘‘further exposed
the state into fragility’’. He points to the neoliberal regime having ‘‘privatised over
three dozen national industries for rent seeking, dichotomised health, education and
communication to discriminate poor citizens from their very birth and adopted
financial capitalism in tune with external advice than national need’’ (2012: 8).
Presenting a more indirect link between neoliberalism and fragility in Nepal, Bhatta
(2013) writing for the Telegraph Nepal, argues that ‘‘Reality is such that donor
supported developmental policies after 1990s (the neo-liberal policies) and political
agendas (inclusive democracy) after 2006 have pushed Nepal to political chaos. Neo-
liberal policies inundated Nepal with NGOs who promoted ‘rights based’ social
society. These very (I)NGOs later floated political agendas such as federalism, and
secularism, which have now become major bones of contention. It is widely believed
that these agendas would become source of latent conflicts in Nepal’’. Bhatta (2013)
blames the international community for having caused ‘‘regime instability, weakened
the state institutions and divided people along different social lines’’. Some
politicians, analysts and journalists have also painted Nepal’s international donors
as instigators of ethnic tension (IRIN, 2013). Thus, rather than being a direct
consequence of neoliberalism’s economic logic, this relates more one of Castree’s
(2008) ‘ideal-type’ characteristics of neoliberalism – the ‘construction of flanking
mechanisms in civil society’ leading to an increasingly important role for NGOs – and
the specific type of development engagement that donors have been promoting.
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army and are the most powerful ministry), their capacity for deal-
ing with DRR is limited.
The first of the two initiatives emerged when Oxfam funded a
national NGO (The National Centre for Disaster Management) to
draft a new Policy and Act. A consultative exercise was undertaken
involving key stakeholders and a series of workshops within and
outside Kathmandu in the five regional centres. The National Policy
was written in 2007 and presented to the National Planning Com-
mission and to various ministries for consideration. However, there
were many changes in government and as noted by a representa-
tive from a national NGO ‘‘nobody knows what happened in the
past. . .all the time [we] remind them [the government] and give
new set of documents’’. As a consequence, the Policy seems almost
lost from the memory of all but a few people who were involved
in it. The simultaneous process of drafting the new Act was highly
contested among interviewees with some suggesting that several
reputable lawyers were involved, while others attributed the draft-
ing of the document to a single lawyer who had just completed his
law degree. This proposed new legislation was promoted through a
symposium and a series of workshops with members of the CA.
However, due to the volatility of the CA, the passing of legislation
was stalled. Respondents noted that politicians had other priorities
at the time, principally drafting a new constitution.
The second initiative, the National Strategy, was coordinated by
UNDP and funded by the European Commission’s Humanitarian
Aid Department, with a national NGO, the National Society for
Earthquake Technology (NSET), serving as the technical consultant.
It is not clear whether UNDP was aware of the already written
National Policy which could have provided a starting point for
developing the new legislative framework for disaster risk man-
agement, but it is clear that a separate process occurred in the for-
mulation of the National Strategy.
As part of the formulation of the National Strategy, a meeting
was held on the 26 February 2007 bringing together 136 represen-
tatives from government, non-government and international
organisations. The National Strategy clearly arose from a thor-
oughly consultative and participatory process. It was intended to
‘‘facilitate the fulfilment of the commitments made by Nepal
through various international conventions and forums towards
DRR’’ (NSDRM, 2008: iv), particularly the HFA by putting forth
‘‘suggestions regarding institutional reorganisation and develop-
ment and strategic improvement in the existing policy and legal
environment’’ (NSDRM, 2008: iv). The National Strategy appears
to be widely accepted and supported at the national level, with
the stakeholders interviewed expressing an alignment with the
National Strategy and no criticism of either the process or the con-
tent. Some interviewees argued that the National Strategy was
necessary to guide the implementation of DRR activities in the
absence of a supportive legislative context. For some this
amounted to a need to ‘‘bypass the government’’ to enable DRR
implementation.
The status and content of the current draft Act remains unclear.
A representative from the Home Ministry explained that the cur-
rent draft Act is based on the 2009 approved National Strategy
but does not include all its recommendations as this would have
severe legal repercussions. It was noted in an IFRC report in 2011
that the revised draft Act will soon go to Cabinet and be made pub-
lically available, however this still appears to be the situation.
Without the Act, there is no budgetary allocation to DRR (Aryal
and Dobson, 2011) which hinders the progress that the govern-
ment can make in effectively implementing DRR.
It is against this backdrop of a well-regarded National Strategy
and a stagnant legislative context that the Nepal Risk Reduction
Consortium (hereafter, the Consortium) was instigated in 2009
by UNDP, and officially launched by the GoN in 2011 (NRRC,
2013). Based on the Hyogo Framework and the National Strategy,
the Consortium aims to support the GoN to develop a long-term
disaster risk management action plan (NRRC, 2013). The Consor-
tium consists of multiple stakeholders working within the human-
itarian and development sectors, including the government, UN
agencies, NGOs, international donors and communities. It has a
steering committee comprising 13 partners and more than 100
organisations and government entities contributing to its
programmes.
The Consortium has five priority or flagship areas (Table 3).
Some interviewees complained that the choice of flagship pro-
grammes had not been made in a transparent or participatory
way and was very much led by the UN. While there have been
notable achievements under the five flagship areas, some of the
Consortium’s more ambitious targets e.g., large-scale retrofitting
of hospitals and schools, will not be met fully by 2015 (Taylor
et al., 2013).17 This has been attributed to a range of factors includ-
ing the scale and breadth of the planned activities; bureaucratic
challenges; and tensions between stakeholders who have not tradi-
tionally worked together including the development and humanitar-
ian sectors (Taylor et al., 2013). However, the majority of
stakeholders interviewed commended the work of the Consortium,
suggesting that it has been particularly successful in raising the pro-
file of DRR within government and among other stakeholder groups,
and is potentially attracting further funding for DRR.
Following a review of the Consortium in 2013 (a few months
after the interviews for this paper were undertaken), the Steering
Committee, which includes senior government officials, took the
decision that the Consortium will continue beyond 2015 to 2020.
However, the impact on the Consortium of the recent elections
and the Disaster Management Act, if passed, remains unclear.
Governance struggles: Stakeholder relationships and power dynamics
In a recent article for the Guardian newspaper, Robert Piper
wrote: ‘‘After five years of working on this in Nepal, I have come
to recognise that addressing Nepal’s vulnerability to natural
hazards is first a governance problem’’ (Piper, 2013). This section
discusses further some of the dynamics of governance of DRR in
post-conflict Nepal and the dynamics of power and influence of
the various stakeholder groups underlying these policy outcomes.
Challenges brought about by the proliferation of NGOs and non-state
actors
The emergence of a multi-stakeholder governance landscape for
DRR is very much evident in Nepal and is unsurprising given the
rise of NGOs. Although some organisations have been working in
Nepal in the field of disaster management for considerable time,18
over the last decade or so, there has clearly been a proliferation of
NGOs engaging in DRR. Many of these were already engaged in
development work in Nepal and increasingly turned their focus to
DRR.19 In some areas this has given rise to duplication and ineffi-
ciency and the development of the National Policy and the National
17 The Consortium has an ambitious funding target. The estimated total budget of
the five-year programme is US$ 195.8 million (NRRC, 2013) and by August 2012
funding for the consortium had reached US$ 65.2 million (Harris et al., 2013). Only a
third of funds have been raised so far.
18 UNDP’s first projects, for example, were some twenty years ago and the Nepal Red
Cross Society have engaged in humanitarian work since 1963, and began disaster
preparedness activities since the mid 1970s. Nepal’s national NGO the National
Society for Earthquake Technology was founded in 1993.
19 To give an indication of the scale of NGO activity in DRR in Nepal, the Association
of International NGOs (AIN) in Nepal has 110 members and 12 claim on AIN’s website
to engage in aspects of disaster management (response, relief, risk reduction,
preparedness). In addition, 57 local partners, 33 implementing partners and 29
donors have registered with Flagship 4 (Flagship 4, 2013). DPNet-Nepal has 82
members including members from government, faith-based organisations, NGOs,
municipalities, civil society organisations, UN departments and military departments.
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Table 2
Comparison of the versions of the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management.
2007 National Policy 2008 NSDRM (draft) 2009 NSDRM (approved, MoHA)
Publication, availability and
translations
Not widely available – held
by individuals
The first version was published in 2008 in English and
later translated into Nepali
Published in 2009
Available on UNDP and NSET’s websites First available (on MoHA’s website) only in Nepali and
only recently (late March 2012) ‘unofficially
translated’ into English (available from UNDP’s
website)
General comments Fairly short (15 pages) and
vague
96 pages; 5 priority areas specified, aligned to Hyogo
principles; 29 strategic activities; strategies for 8
different sectorsa
126 pages; 5 priority areas specified, aligned to Hyogo
principles; 29 strategic activities; strategies for 8
different sectors
National level structure
(tier 1)
Disaster Management
Council (DMC) headed by
PM with Home Minister as
VC. 3 ministers and 9
secretaries from various
ministries; also heads of
police, army and armed
police, and Nepal Red Cross
Society, and 3 other NGOs;
2 disaster management
experts. ‘‘Full responsibility
to carry out all facets of
disaster management inter
alia formulation, policy,
implementation,
supervision of the policies,
plans and other procedural
matters’’
National Commission for Disaster Risk Management
as the ‘governing authority’, chaired by the PM, with
the function of endorsing policies and plans,
arranging and overseeing funding. Intended to beb a
‘constitutional body’ with authority ‘over’ the
ministriesc. In the Nepali version of the 2008 National
Strategy, the position of the National Commission,
while not explicitly stated, is implied through use of
the terms anumodan (meaning approve) and srowth
(meaning resource allocation). It is suggested that the
National Commission will have both of these powers,
which only constitutional bodies holdd. Membership
– all cabinet ministers, 2 civil society reps, chiefs of
police, army, armed police
National Council for Disaster Management, chaired by
the PM, VC or co-chair is Minister of Home -
membership should be comprised of the Ministers
from all 19 ministries, the Chief of Police and Army as
well as four members representing NGOs (including
women, backward classes and dalits) and two disaster
management experts
No constitutional powers specified but endorsing and
approving policies is stated as a key function if this
apex body. ‘‘The government of Nepal can make
change of members’’
National level structure
(tier 2)
n/a The National Authority for Disaster Risk Management
as the ‘focal point’ and coordinating body for
facilitating and monitoring implementation of
disaster risk management strategies – to develop
Standard Operating Procedures, guidelines, collect
data, operate disaster fund – considerable detail in
terms of tasks and responsibilities, Chair to be
appointed by NCDRM, with membership comprising
of technical committee members (see below).
Emphasis is placed on expertise rather than
government staff
National Disaster Management Authority to
implement, facilitate, coordinate and monitor disaster
management activities. No membership is specified
but it is specified that ‘‘MoHA [is] to function as a
contact agency between government and NDMA’’ and
that the GoN shall make provision of necessary staff
to work in NDMA and may depute personnel from its
ministries
Sub-national 3 Management
Committees: Preparedness
Management Technical
Committee convened by the
Minister for Local
Development; Rescue and
Relief Management
convened by Minister of
Home Affairs and
Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction convened by
the Minister for Physical
Planning and Works
‘Technical committees’ (may be part of NADRM)
consisting of highly reputable individuals,
government technical departments, NGOs, academic
institutions and research centres. Not specified who
they would be led by
3 ‘High level’ Management Committees:
Preparedness Management Committee convened by
the Minister for Local Development; Rescue and Relief
Management Committee convened by Minister of
Home Affairs and Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Committee convened by the Minister for Physical
Planning and Works – comprising of 2–3 ministers
and 3–8 secretaries in each, with Director generals of
government departments, 2/3 NGO reps and 2 experts
on each Regional DMA – regional administrators etc
District level structure District Disaster
Management Committees
chaired by CDOs with Local
Development Officer as
member secretary
District and Municipal Authorities for Disaster Risk
Management to be headed by the Chief of the District
Development Committee (sometimes also referred to
as the Chief of District Government). This position is
held by a VDC chair or vice chair (an elected position)
who has been elected by all the VDC chairs and vice
chairs in the district. The roles and responsibilities of
the Chief of District Government falls under the
Ministry of Local Development. CDO is an ordinary
member
District Disaster Management Authorities chaired by
the Chief District Officer (bureaucrat/ central
government employee under the Ministry of Home
Affairs)
Village level structure Local Disaster Management
Committees; chaired by
mayor of municipality or
VDC chairperson
Village Development Committees (VDCs) to be the
lowest tier of the governance structure and frontline
institution to manage disaster risks, comprising of
elected representatives from the village and ward
levels
Local Disaster Management Committees (VDC level) –
prepare and execute local disaster management plans
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Strategy concurrently by different organisations is a case in point. As
a representative from a UN organisation remarked ‘‘when I came I
noticed that there was one group of people that were more involved
in the Strategy and another group of people that were more involved
in the Act. . ..certain people were more champions of one and other peo-
ple were more champions of the other’’. It is evident that some animos-
ity arose through this process. One interviewee, for example,
suggested that UNDP denied that the draft Act had ever been pre-
sented to the government by Oxfam, in what another respondent
described as ‘‘a battle of egos’’.
In other respects, NGOs are presented as filling a gap, particu-
larly in terms of implementation, that the government is unable
to address. As one international NGO representative noted: ‘‘cur-
rently the DRR works that’s being done in Nepal implemented at the
field level it’s more done by the NGO sector and still we don’t have
in government’’. The focus on NGOs by donors was justified in terms
of a low level of government capacity: ‘‘We are trying to work
through the government, build government’s disaster risk manage-
ment capacity. .. but systems simply don’t exist currently’’ (donor rep-
resentative). This view is shared by the NGO community: ‘‘NGOs
are there because the government is not doing so - if the government’s
perfect there is no need of NGO’’ (INGO representative). The govern-
ment does not necessarily agree with this situation however, as a
representative of a bi-lateral donor organisation noted: ‘‘the gov-
ernment doesn’t want the money to be going to international NGOs
– they understandably want it to be going through them, so there is
always this tightrope really and there is a lot of tension’’.
Comments made by interviewees about the problems that arise
from channelling money down to local NGOs reflect those in the
literature. For example, one independent consultant noted that
‘‘there are zillions of NGOs [in Nepal] – it’s kind of an entrepreneurial
thing’’. A representative from a bi-lateral donor described the situ-
ation as ‘‘a bit of a festival of NGOs because...they know that there is
the resilience thing and donors are interested in this and everybody
wants to try and get involved’’. Coordination of the many local
implementing NGOs working on the ground is challenging not only
between organisations, but within organisations. It was claimed
that in some areas, different departments in donor organisations
‘‘don’t even know quite what they’re supporting as an organisation
– the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing’’ and their
projects in particular areas may have no connection with each
other, creating overlap and wasted resources. A donor representa-
tive confirmed that ‘‘donor coordination at the best of times is very,
very difficult.’’ The uneven distribution of NGOs is also problematic.
A well functioning state would at least enable a consistent
approach to DRR planning at the local level and facilitate coverage
across the whole country. Guidelines have been produced by
the Development Ministry, supported by Oxfam, to standardise
disaster risk management planning at the lower levels of
government which offers opportunities for a more systematic
approach. Furthermore Flagship 4 is tracking CBDRR implementa-
tion across Nepal with a view to enhancing coordination and con-
sistency. It is advocating 9 characteristics of a disaster resilient
community as a minimum standard for community based DRR
projects. It is hoped that such initiatives will improve donor coor-
dination and strengthen NGO-led DRR projects.
While donors tend to fund international NGOs, which in turn
work with local NGOs on the ground for project implementation,
some of the national NGOs argue that they are being by-passed
by donors. As one director of a national NGO put it ‘‘. . .the West
has trained us. . .there has been a significant, you know, capacity built
up here. Compare [national NGO] with any other organisation in the
West. We are strong. Why should we be barred from competing?’’
With regards to the Consortium specifically, a key criticism was
the way the agenda was being taken over by international organi-
sations and foreign experts, and for some, undermining existing
national capacity. There is a question though, of whether existing
national level institutions might have been equally able to perform
the Consortium’s current functions. For example, the Disaster Pre-
paredness Network Nepal (DPNet-Nepal) a multi-stakeholder net-
work engaged in disaster preparedness was identified as a possible
mechanism for this. However, its capacity was not deemed by
some stakeholders interviewed to be particularly high. A represen-
tative of a national NGO noted that ‘‘the flagship programme is really
under the, you can say, patronage, umbrella, whatever you call it, of
the UNDP. That has a very kind of, you know, influence on the govern-
ment and on the international scene. . . [we] need that kind of lever-
age. [With DPNet-Nepal] that kind of weight is not there. It
[DPNet-Nepal] can do a lot of work, it can really mobilise a lot of peo-
ple it has the connections and membership of so many of the major
stakeholders. . ..but then at the same time it’s after all an NGO’’.
Similarly it was suggested by some interviewees that UNDP
might have invested their efforts in developing an effective
National Platform to align to UNISDR’s recommendations, rather
than creating a new institutional structure in the form of the Con-
sortium. This was also posed as a question by a representative of
the Consortium: ‘‘So I asked about the National Platform. . .and I
was told that it hadn’t been fully functional in the last few years
and that there was also some confusion around its status, given that
it had been created as a NGO’’. One interviewee noted that the doc-
umentation for the Global Platform had been produced by an out-
side consultant in the absence of a functioning National Platform. It
could be argued then that the Consortium was created as a parallel
structure because the capacity and authority did not exist at the
national level to fulfil the functions that the Consortium currently
serves and this would have taken too long to build. Robert Piper,
the then UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Nepal,
has mentioned elsewhere that the urgency of the situation
warranted high level, effective and rapid intervention. For example
in a UNISDR meeting in Paris, he noted that ‘‘it’s a race against time
Table 2 (continued)
2007 National Policy 2008 NSDRM (draft) 2009 NSDRM (approved, MoHA)
Role of Communities Ward level sub-committees
and volunteer groups could
be developed; women and
disadvantaged groups to be
prioritised
Community based organisations should be
strengthened to promote community level disaster
risk management activities. To include training in
light search and rescue and first aid
Community based organisations should be
strengthened to promote community level disaster
risk management activities. To include training in
light search and rescue and first aid
a Based on 8 workshops with 36–80 participants.
b Source: One of the authors of this paper was in attendance at a key national strategy formulation meeting where this was agreed upon.
c Like the existing Anti-corruption Agency in Nepal and the UK’s COBRA.
d ‘Approval’ otherwise having to be channelled through the Cabinet and Parliament and ‘resource allocation’ otherwise needing to be obtained from the National Planning
Commission in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance.
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to save as many lives as possible before Nepal faces its next large scale
disaster. That is why we have put together the Nepal Risk Reduction
Consortium’’ (McClean, 2012).
Government ownership, power struggles, capacity and commitment
As more than one interviewee explained, the Home Ministry is
not a development ministry and ‘you can’t manage disasters by
batons and guns’. A representative from a NGO explained that ‘‘it
is imperative that other development ministries such as the health,
education, public works, and local development should be made capa-
ble enough to lead disaster risk management initiatives as develop-
ment agenda. Managing disaster risk is a development challenge’’. It
is thoroughly logical therefore for the Ministry of Federal Affairs
and Local Development (hereafter the Development Ministry) to
Table 3
NRRC Flagship Areas. Source: Adapted from the NRRC, 2013: ii and Reddick pers. comm.
Aim of flagship Coordinator and Government lead Budget
(US $
million)
Key achievements
Flagship 1: School and Hospital Safety Asian Development Bank (ADB), 57.1 Completed
To strengthen over 900 school buildings and
the major health care facilities in the
Kathmandu Valley for earthquake
resistance and service continuity
World Health Organisation (WHO)  65 schools retrofitted by MoE and 260 schools being
retrofitted by an ADB/AusAid led initiativeMinistry of Education (MoE),
Underway
Ministry of Population and Health
 Assessment of public school building stock in
Kathmandu Valley by World Bank
 DfID funded hospital assessment (phases 1 & 2 to be
completed in 2013)
 ECHO non-structural hospital safety
Flagship 2. Emergency Preparedness and
Response Capacity
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA)
55.2 Completed
 83 open spaces secured by GoN
To prepare and train medical first responders,
develop disaster response and information
management plans, prepare open spaces
and facilitate international assistance for
emergency response
Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)  36 District, Regional and Municipal emergency
operation centres established
Underway
 National Disaster Response Framework is being
finalised
 Developing plans to use open spaces for emergency
response
 US $2 million secured for urban search and rescue
 National strategy for urban search and rescue is
being finalised
Flagship 3. Flood Management in the Kosi River
Basin
World Bank 26.2 Completed
To reduce flood risk in the Kosi River Basin
through detailed assessments, forecasting
and mitigation activities
 ‘Building Resilience to Climate-Related Hazards’
been approved by the Pilot Program for Climate
Resilience Sub-committee in August 2012
Ministry of Irrigation
 Rapid Field Assessment of Kosi River completed
 15 km embankment constructed with support from
Government of India
Underway
 Pilot probabilistic risk assessment
 Identification of another river basin
 Coordination with Flagship 4 of ‘last-mile’ early
warning
Flagship 4. Integrated Community Based DRR International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies
44.3 Completed
To complete community based DRR activities
in 1000 Village Development Committees/
municipalities over 5-years
 Over 500 CBDRR activities tracked
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local
Development (MoFALD)
 Project tracking system developed to assess project
compliance to minimum characteristics
 20 district consultations completed
Underway
 Urban DRR coordination mechanism being
developed
Flagship 5. Policy/Institutional Support for
DRM
UN Development Programme (UNDP) 13 Completed
To integrate DRM in plans, policies and
programmes at national, district and local
levels and strengthen the enforcement and
compliance of building codes
 Training of masons and engineers in the Kathmandu
Valley
Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)
 Disaster risk management focal points established in
23 government ministries/departments
 Risk sensitive land use plan agreed for Kathmandu
 Local level mainstreaming approved by government
 Roadmap for enhancing building code
implementation developed
Underway
 Training of masons and engineers in the Kathmandu
Valley
 Replication of risk sensitive land use plan underway
outside Kathmandu Valley
 District guidelines for local level mainstreaming
underway
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be granted the responsibility for rolling out DRR to the local level
due to their role in local development and leading the shift from
disaster response to DRR. The Home Ministry, however, seems
reluctant to relinquish any power.
The Home Ministry has demonstrated its power (and perhaps
its resistance to be dictated to) in a number of other ways. For
example, changes were made to the draft National Strategy by gov-
ernment before approval. The National Strategy proposed that the
new national authority should sit directly under the Prime
Minister’s Office where it would have authority over other minis-
tries to mainstream DRR. If the new authority sits within the Home
Ministry it will not have the constitutional or budgetary powers to
effectively enable mainstreaming throughout other ministries. The
approved National Strategy is somewhat ambiguous stating that
‘the Government of Nepal will build upon existing structures and
gradually transform them into new structures as necessary’
(MoHA, 2009: 75). Table 2 documents other changes (e.g. at the
District level) illustrating the Home Ministry’s efforts to retain
power.
While there are still few signs within government of progress
towards a national disaster management authority headed by the
Prime Minister, there is movement within the Home Ministry
towards creating a larger division. This would be an opportunity
to build a higher capacity within government and provided some
ground for optimism among some of the interviewees. It was sug-
gested that the Consortium could be redundant in the future as it
could be replaced by a National Platform that the government
would be strong enough to coordinate. Others argued however,
that the Consortium is reaching the limits of what it can achieve
without the government’s full commitment. As a representative
of the Consortium explained: ‘‘[We said to the government] we
are losing interest. You are talking to me about the fact that there
needs to be more resources and I am telling you very frankly there
aren’t going to be more resources without a sign that the government
is serious and that the government is putting in more absorptive
capacity.’’
A key challenge currently faced is the extremely low staffing
and limited DRR expertise in the Home Ministry. Currently the
Home Ministry’s Disaster Management Section consists of only
three staff members who were not disaster management experts
when they come into post. They also have other responsibilities
besides disaster management. Despite the training that interna-
tional organisations offer (for example, the UNDP as part of Flag-
ship 5) the rapid through flow of staff creates a challenge for
building expertise within the government. A larger division dem-
onstrates some effort by the government to increase its absorptive
capacity but is a long way from a national authority under the
Prime Minister’s office.
In some interviews, a more harmonious picture was presented
and there appeared to be little evidence of a conflicting agenda
between government and donors and multilateral agencies. A
representative from the Disaster Management Section in the
Home Ministry was quite clear that they lead on legal and policy
matters around DRR and did not regard donors as influencing
their practice. One Home Ministry representative noted ‘‘We don’t
like to say like ‘influences’ because ‘influences’ has something like a
negative connotation. . .What ‘inspire’ us to change our policy?’’. He
explained proudly that they had fed into the Global Platform evi-
dence of good practice in Nepal – thus both shaping and being
informed by practices elsewhere that may enable them to
improve practice. He did however acknowledge the significance
of donor funding: ‘‘the national government doesn’t have lot of
funds for the prevention of disaster activity and if we follow their
activity or their recommendations then it is easy for us to get the
fund from outside’’. As a UN representative explained with respect
to DRR ‘‘The Government Ministries have a choice whether or not
they want to do this.. .There are sticks and carrots in the whole pro-
cess and there’s no doubt that the fact that there are resources there
helps.’’
While ‘sticks and carrots’ are clearly quite significant in the DRR
process, it is difficult to locate centres of power or identify who is
leading the process, as a degree of circularity seems to be in oper-
ation. Many donor and multilateral agencies laboured the point
that DRR and the Consortium were ‘government led’ to convey a
sense of ownership. Donors claim that they ‘‘fund the gaps’’ or
‘‘respond to government requests’’ and that the ‘‘government leads’’
but at the same time they shape government priorities. For exam-
ple, a representative of the Consortium noted that ‘‘if people are
speaking about it at the same time, and people are hopefully using
the same words, and the same rationale then hopefully they [the gov-
ernment] get a sense that this is something that is very important to
the international community. Which, incidentally, we’re only doing on
the behalf of our partners in government – MoHA [the Home Minis-
try] has requested it and we’re supporting them in that request’’. Sim-
ilarly a representative from a bi-lateral donor noted that ‘‘we need
to try and help the government to prioritise more so that we can prop-
erly support that’’. A representative from a multi-lateral donor
explained that ‘‘investments on reducing risks has to be led by gov-
ernment. Development partners cannot be of support, unless it is the
government’s priority.’’
Thus donors and multi-lateral agencies avoid using a language
that makes it appear that they are leading DRR (while at the same
time threatening to withdraw funding if the government do not
show more commitment). Without these interventions, Nepal
would be much further behind in addressing HFA priorities. The
government is not being by-passed or ignored in the process of
supporting DRR. While being classed as a ‘fragile’ state, it was
pointed out by many interviewees that the state is powerful when
it wants to achieve something (such as the road widening scheme
in Kathmandu), and will not engage in anything it does not want to
do. But donor funding is a clear ‘carrot’ in the DRR process.
Conclusions
‘‘It’s all a bit messy, I think, to an outsider looking in. Depending on
your point of view you might say it’s. . .been a fantastic achieve-
ment in terms of bringing those groups together. Pessimistically
you could say that we’re all falling all over each other and there’s
no real coordination. I mean that’s one of the challenges of devel-
opment actually, for the most part.’’
[Bi-lateral donor representative]
Drawing a conclusion to the governance struggles and policy
processes evident in DRR in Nepal presents quite a challenge. Opin-
ions were found to be manifold and conflicting, with each intervie-
wee presenting a different perspective on the challenges and
achievements that have been made. As the quotation above sug-
gests, it is very easy to view the same situation from different
positions. A single, consensual ‘truth’ does not exist. It is hoped,
at least, that this research has provided insights into the complex-
ity of processes around policy formation in DRR in a post-conflict
country.
To some degree, in line with the neoliberal approach, a shift
from government to governance is evident in the context of DRR
in Nepal. This includes the influence of ‘upwards’ transnational
networks (implementing the HFA), along with the growing ‘out-
wards’ role of non-government actors in DRR. As a country relying
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heavily on donor funding, the UN and donor organisations have a
great deal of influence on the development agenda in Nepal. It is
apparent that the GoN would not be engaging in DRR without
the pressure and resources from the international community.20
In the absence of state level expertise and capacity, international
and national NGOs also play an important role in the implementa-
tion of the DRR programmes, while the Consortium plays a vital
coordination role in what has been quite a haphazard DRR landscape
due to the proliferation of NGOs. Despite this, the state is still the
centre of political power in Nepal.
Tensions were noted arising from the complex interplay of
power, knowledge and differential access to resources of the many
different stakeholders engaged in the governance of DRR. The sig-
nificant role that non-state actors play creates challenges for gov-
ernment ownership. There is some concern that the progress made
through the Consortium ‘‘reduces the incentive to centralise the
issue as a core priority for the GoN, leaving it generally under-
served in national budgeting processes’’ (Taylor et al., 2013: 38).
In addition, the sometimes hegemonic approach of the interna-
tional community to DRR is the source of tension between the
international community and national NGOs who in some cases
felt as though their expertise and experience was not valued. Rep-
resentatives from the UN and donor organisations emphasised
repeatedly that they were working at the request of, and in part-
nership with, the GoN and that they are working through existing
governance structures, and drawing on national expertise, where
and when they could. However, it was also acknowledged that
these mechanisms and expertise do not always exist. This could
be a priority area of capacity-building for donors, via the Consor-
tium, as part of its exit strategy.
What, then, are the implications of this messiness and complex-
ity? There are aspects of DRR that require strong centralised gover-
nance, for example establishing and overseeing national
emergency operating centres and maintaining critical lifeline ser-
vices. This role does not necessarily need to be played by the state,
but it does require a long-term vision, resources and authority.
Currently the Consortium is playing a strong coordinating role in
this area. However, this raises questions regarding the sustainabil-
ity of disaster risk governance in Nepal. If the Consortium exits too
soon, it may leave very little legacy; however if it stays too long,
there is a danger that national capacity and ownership will not
be developed. Findings suggest that the GoN needs to accord
higher priority to developing institutional structures such as a
National Disaster Management Authority and a National Platform
so they can own the process and lead future resilience building
in Nepal, but they are still some way from genuine ownership
and institutionalisation. Brass’s (2012: 229) conclusions from
Kenya are relevant here: ‘‘One hopes to avoid a mass exodus of
international funds until the capacity of local NGOs, government
and civil society has grown to fill the space occupied by them’’. It
is likely that other post-conflict states embarking on donor-driven
DRR will face similar challenges.
Acknowledgements
This research was carried out with financial support from
Northumbria University and the Natural Environment Research
Council and the Economic and Social Research Council under the
Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards programme as part of
the Earthquakes without Frontiers project (Grant number: NE/
J01995X/1). We would like to extend our thanks to: Moira Reddick,
Coordinator of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium; and Amod
Mani Dixit, Surya Narayan Shrestha and Gopi Baysal at NSET-Nepal
for their assistance. Sincere thanks to: Dr Ben Wisner, Oberlin Col-
lege, Ohio; and Prof. Jonathan Rigg, National University of Singa-
pore for their helpful and critical comments on earlier drafts of
this paper. Finally, we would like to extend our thanks to the stake-
holders in Nepal who kindly agreed to be interviewed for this
research project.
References
Ahrens, J., Rudolph, P.M., 2006. The importance of governance in risk reduction and
disaster management. J. Contingencies Crisis Manage. 14 (4), 207–220.
Allen, K., 2006. Community based disaster preparedness and climate adaptation:
local capacity building in the Philippines. Disasters 30 (1), 81–101.
Aryal, K., Dobson, O., 2011. Guidelines for integrating weather related disasters risk
reduction and adaptation in Asia and the Pacific Regions for senior government
officials (Volume One and Two). Project Report. Yonsei University and National
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). Seoul, Korea.
Bebbington, A.J., 2005. Donor-NGO relations and representations of livelihood in
nongovernmental aid chains. World Dev. 33 (6), 937–950.
Benson, C., Twigg, J., Myers, M., 2001. NGO initiatives in risk reduction: an overview.
Disasters 25 (3), 199–215.
Betsill, M.M., Bulkeley, H., 2004. Transnational networks and global environmental
governance: the cities for climate protection program. Int. Stud. Quart. 48, 471–
493.
Bhatta, C.D., 2013. Nepal: Antinomies of Democracy, Peace and External Influence,
13th June 2013, Telegraph Nepal. <http://telegraphnepal.com/views/2013-06-
13/nepal:-antinomies-of-democracy-peace> (accessed 11.10.13).
Bohara, A.K., Mitchell, N.J., Nepal, M., 2006. Opportunity, democracy and the
exchange of political violence – a subnational analysis of conflict in Nepal. J.
Conflict Resolut. 50 (1), 108–128.
Booth, D., 2011. Towards a theory of local governance and public goods provision.
IDS Bull. 42 (2), 11–21.
Brass, J.N., 2012. Blurring boundaries: the integration of NGOs into governance in
Kenya. Governance: Int. J. Pol. Admin. Inst. 25 (2), 209–235.
Brinkerhoff, D.W., 2005. Rebuilding governance in failed states and post-conflict
societies: core concepts and cross-cutting themes. Public Admin. Develop. 25,
3–14.
Bulkeley, H., Jordan, A., 2012. Transnational environmental governance: newfindings
and emerging research agendas. Environ. Plann. C: Govern. Pol. 30, 556–570.
Castree, N., 2008. Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and
reregulation. Environ. Plann. A 40, 131–152.
Christoplos, I., Mitchell, J., Liljelund, A., 2001. Re-framing risk: the changing context
of disaster mitigation and preparedness. Disasters 25 (3), 185–198.
Collins, A.E., 2009. Disaster and Development. Routledge, London.
Comfort, L., Wisner, B., Cutter, S., et al., 1999. Reframing disaster policy. Environ.
Hazards 1, 39–44.
Dahal, D.R., 2012. Problem of order and political culture of Nepal, readings on
governance and development. In: Institute for Governance and Development,
Kathmandu, vol. XIV. pp. 1–12.
Davis, D.R., Murdie, A., 2012. Looking in the mirror: comparing INGO networks
across issue areas. Rev. Int. Organ. 7 (2), 177–202.
Djalante, R., Thomalla, F., Sinapoy, M.S., Carnegie, M., 2012. Building resilience to
natural hazards in Indonesia: progress and challenges in implementing the
Hyogo Framework for Action. Nat. Hazards 62, 779–803.
Ebrahim, A., 2003. Accountability in practice, mechanisms for NGOs. World
Develop. 31 (5), 813–829.
Ensor, T., Clapham, S., Prasia, D.P., 2009. What drives health policy formulation:
insights from the Nepal maternity incentive scheme. Health Policy 90, 247–
253.
Flagship 4, 2013. Project Registration Statistics. <http://flagship4.nrrc.org.np/sites/
default/files/documents/Registration%20sheet%20cover%20note%2025%20march%
202013.pdf> (accessed 12.07.13).
Frewer, T., 2013. Doing NGOWork: the politics of being ‘civil society’ and promoting
‘good governance’ in Cambodia. Aust. Geogr. 44 (1), 97–114.
Fund for Peace, 2012. Failed State Index Data 2012. Fund for Peace. <http://
ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2012-sortable> (accessed 14.07.13).
Gaillard, J.C., Mercer, J., 2012. From knowledge to action: bridging gaps in disaster
risk reduction. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 37 (1), 93–114.
Gainsborough, M., 2010. Vietnam: Rethinking the State. Zed books, London.
Gane, N., 2012. The governmentalities of neoliberalism: panopticism, post-
panopticism and beyond. Sociol. Rev. 60, 611–634.
GeoHazards International, 2001. Final Report – Global Earthquake Safety Initiative
(GESI) Pilot Project. GeoHazards International and United National Centre for
Regional Development. June 2001. <http://www.geohaz.org/news/images/
publications/gesi-report%20with%20prologue.pdf> (accessed 08.10.13).
Godfrey, M., Sophal, C., Kato, T.A., et al., 2002. Technical assistance and capacity
development in an aid-dependent economy: the experience of Cambodia.
World Dev. 30 (3), 355–373.
20 From this perspective it could be argued that the shift from government to
governance is evident in disaster management, but not in DRR as there were no
government mechanisms for DRR before outside stakeholders advanced the agenda.
88 S. Jones et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 78–90
Goodwin, M., 1998. The governance of rural areas: some emerging research issues
and agendas. J. Rural Stud. 14 (1), 5–12.
Grindle, M.S., 2004. Good enough governance: poverty reduction and reform in
developing countries. Governance: Int. J. Pol. Admin. Inst. 17 (4), 525–548.
Grindle, M.S., 2011. Good enough governance revisited. Develop. Policy Rev. 29 (s1),
s199–s221.
GSDRC, 2013. Fragile States. <http://www.gsdrc.org/go/fragile-states/chapter-1–
understanding-fragile-states/definitions-and-typologies-of-fragile-states> (accessed
11.06.13).
Harris, K., Keen, D., Mitchell, T., 2013. When Disasters and Conflict Collide:
Improving Links between Disaster Resilience and Conflict Prevention. Overseas
Development Institute, London.
Hulme, D., Edwards, M., 1997. NGOs, states and donors: an overview. In: Hulme, D.,
Edwards, M. (Eds.), NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? Macmillan
Press Ltd, Basingstoke.
Hyden, G., 2008. After the Paris declaration: taking on the issue of power. Develop.
Policy Rev. 26 (3), 259–274.
IFRC, 2011. Analysis of Legislation Related to Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal.
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva.
Igoe, J., Brockington, D., 2007. Neoliberal conservation: a brief introduction.
Conserv. Soc. 5 (4), 432–449.
IRIN, 2013. Analysis: Politicians, Donors Question Donor Neutrality in Nepal. IRIN –
Humanitarian News and Analysis. 26 February 2013. <http://www.
irinnews.org/report/97551/analysis-politicians-donors-question-donor-neutrality-
in-nepal> (accessed 27.02.13).
Kellett, J., Sparks, D., 2012. Disaster Risk Reduction - Spending Where it Should
Count. Global Humanitarian Assistance, Somerset, UK.
Lavell, A., Maskrey, A., 2013. The Future of Disaster Risk Management. An On-going
Discussion. <http://www.ilankelman.org/miscellany/scoping.pdf> (accessed
25.11.13).
Lebel, L., Anderies, J.M., Campbell, B., et al., 2006. Governance and the capacity to
manage resilience in regional socio-ecological systems. Ecol. Soc. 11 (1), 19.
Lewis, D., Kanji, N., 2009. Non-governmental Organisations and Development.
Routledge, London.
MacNeil, R., Patterson, M., 2012. Neoliberal climate policy: frommarket fetishism to
the developmental state. Environ. Polit. 21 (2), 230–247.
Manandhar, N., 2013. Nepal: Corruption inside NGOs, 13th March 2013, Telegraph
Nepal. <http://www.telegraphnepal.com/views/2013-03-13/nepal:-corruption-
inside-ngos> (accessed 28.10.13).
Manyena, S.B., Mavhura, E., Muzenda, C., Mabaso, E., 2013. Disaster risk reduction
legislations: Is there a move from events to processes? Global Environ. Change
23, 1786–1794.
Maskrey, A., 1989. Disaster Mitigation: A Community based Approach,
Development Guidelines 3. Oxfam, Oxford.
McClean, D., 2012. Nepal’s Tragedy in Waiting. UNISDR News Archive. <http://
www.unisdr.org/archive/29755> (accessed 12.07.13).
Medina, L.K., 2010. When government targets ‘the state’: Transnational NGO
government and the state in Belize. Polit. Legal Anthropol. Rev. 33 (2), 245–263.
Mosse, D., 2013. The anthropology of international development. Ann. Rev.
Anthropol. 42, 227–246.
MoF, 2013. Foreign Aid in Nepal, FY 2011–12. Kathmandu: International Economic
Cooperation Coordination Division, Ministry of Finance (MoF), Government of
Nepal.
MoHA, 1982. Natural Disaster Relief Act (Unofficial Translation). Kathmandu: His
Majesty’s Government, Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA).
MoHA, 1996. National Action Plan on Disaster Management in Nepal. Kathmandu:
His Majesty’s Government, Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA).
MoHA, 2009. National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management, 2009 (Unofficial
Translation). His Majesty’s Government, Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA);
UNDP; and the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid. <http://un.org.np/
sites/default/files/report/2010-08-06-nsdrm-in-eng-2009.pdf> (accessed
14.07.13).
Murshed, S.M., Gates, S., 2005. Spatial-horizontal inequality and the Maoist
Insurgency in Nepal. Rev. Develop. Econ. 9 (1), 121–134.
Nepal Disaster Report, 2011. Nepal Disaster Report. Policies, Practices and Lessons.
ActionAid – Nepal; Disaster Preparedness Network Nepal; Ministry of Home
Affairs; National Society for Earthquake Technology – Nepal; United Nations
Development Programme – Nepal. <http://www.preventionweb.net/files/
29915_ndr2011.pdf> (accessed 12.07.13).
Newar, N., 2013. Rules of Engagement. Nepal Times. <http://nepaltimes.com/
article/nation/Rules-of-engagement,247> (accessed 11.10.13).
NRRC, 2013. Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium Flagship Programmes. Nepal Risk
Reduction Consortium (NRRC), Kathmandu.
NSDRM, 2008. National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management in Nepal (Draft).
Government of Nepal; United Nations Development Programme – Nepal;
National Society for Earthquake Technology – Nepal; and the European
Commission for Humanitarian Aid.
O’Reilly, K., 2010. The promise of patronage: adopting and adapting neo-liberal
development. Antipode 41 (1), 179–200.
OECD, 2010. The 2010 DAC Report on Multilateral Aid. <http://www.oecd.org/
development/effectiveness/45828572.pdf> (accessed 11.06.13).
OECD, 2013. Principles for Fragile States and Situations. <http://www.oecd.org/
dacfragilestates/> (accessed 11.06.13).
Ojha, H.R., Cameron, J., Kumar, C., 2009. Deliberation or symbolic violence? The
governance of community forestry in Nepal. Forest Policy Econ. 11, 365–
374.
Pandey, S., 2012. The politics of foreign aid. Nepali Times. Issue 620, 31 August
2012–6 September 2012. <http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19592#.
U7bqnvNwbIU> (accessed 11.10.13).
Persson, A., 2009. Environmental policy integration and bilateral development
assistance: challenges and opportunities with an evolving governance
framework. Int. Environ. Agreements 9, 409–429.
Petley, D.N., Hearn, G.J., Hart, A., Rosser, N.J., Oven, K.J., Mitchell, W.A., 2007. Trends
in landslide occurrence in Nepal. Nat. Hazards 43, 23–34.
Piper, R., 2013. A perfect storm of earthquake and poor governance could cripple
Nepal. The Guardian, Comment is Free, 12 January 2013. <http://
www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jan/12/perfect-storm-earthquake-
cripple-nepal> (accessed 12.07.13).
Pradhan, B.K., 2007. Disaster Preparedness for Natural Hazards: Current Status in
Nepal. Kathmandu: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development.
<http://dmc.iris.washington.edu/hq/files/about_iris/governance/ds/docs/Preparedness
InNepal.pdf> (accessed 12.07.13).
Rajan, S.R., 2002. Disaster, development and governance: Reflections on the lessons
of Bhopal. Environ. Values 11, 369–394.
Renn, O., Klinke, A., van Asselt, M., 2011. Coping with complexity, uncertainty and
ambiguity in risk governance: a synthesis. Ambio 40, 231–246.
Rondinelli, D.A., Montgomery, J.D., 2005. Regime change and nation building: can
donors restore governance in post-conflict states? Public Admin. Develop. 25,
15–23.
Suleiman, L., 2013. The NGOs and the grand illusions of development and
democracy. Voluntas 24, 241–261.
Taylor, G., Vatsa, K., Gurung, M., Couture, E., 2013. Review of the Nepal Risk
Reduction Consortium (NRRC). Final Report. 22 August 2013. <http://
www.un.org.np/reports/review-report> (accessed 04.07.14).
Thapa, G.B., Sharma, J., 2011. The democratic deficit and federalism in Nepal: is it
a cure or part of the problem? Lex Localis – J. Local Self-Govern. 9 (1),
39–66.
The Himalayan Times, 2014. Editorial: Action Counts. 18 June 2014. <http://
www.thehimalayantimes.com/fullNews.php?headline=EDITORIAL%3A+Action+
counts&NewsID=418548> (accessed 20.06.14).
Townsend, J.G., Porter, G., Mawdsley, E., 2004. Creating spaces of resistance:
development NGOs and their clients in Ghana, India and Mexico. Antipode 36
(5), 871–889.
Transparency International, 2009. Corruption Threatens Global Economic Recovery,
Greatly Challenges Countries in Conflict. Transparency International. <http://
transparency.ie/sites/default/files/CPI_2009_Presskit_complete_en.pdf>
(accessed 08.10.13).
UKAid, 2012. Statistics on International Development 2007/8–2011/12. National
Statistics. <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/67317/SID-2012.pdf> (accessed 17.05.13).
UNDP, 2011. Supporting Transformational Change. Case Studies of Sustained and
Successful Development Cooperation. New York: United Nations Development
Programme.
UNDP, 2013. The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World. Human
Development Report 2013. New York: United Nations Development
Programme.
UNISDR, 2007a. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. Building the Resilience of
Nations and Communities to Disasters. Extract from the final report of
the World Conference on Disaster Reduction (A/CONF.206/6). United Nations
Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). <http://www.unisdr.org/files/1037_
hyogoframeworkforactionenglish.pdf> (accessed 12.07.13).
UNISDR, 2007b. Guidelines: National Platforms for Disaster Risk Reduction
(DRR10287). United Nations Office for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). <http://
www.unisdr.org/files/601_engguidelinesnpdrr.pdf> (accessed 12.07.13).
UNISDR, 2009. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Risk and
Poverty in a Changing Climate. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. <http://www.preventionweb.
net/english/hyogo/gar/report/documents/GAR_Chapter_5_2009_eng.pdf> (accessed
04.07.14).
UNISDR, 2011. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Revealing
Risk, Redefining Development. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. <http://www.preventionweb.
net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/home/download.html> (accessed 12.07.13).
UNISDR, 2013. Annex 3 – Progress in implementing the Hyogo Framework for
Action 2011-2013. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2013.
From Shared Risk to Shared Value: The Business Case for Disaster Risk
Reduction. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction. <http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2013/
en/gar-pdf/Annex_3.pdf> (accessed 04.07.14).
Van Asselt, M.B.A., Renn, O., 2011. Risk governance. J. Risk Res. 14 (4),
431–449.
Von Einsiedel, S., Malone, D.M., Pradhan, S., 2012. Introduction. In: Von Einsiedel, S.,
Malone, D.M., Pradhan, S. (Eds.), Nepal in Transition – From People’s War to
Fragile Peace. Cambridge University Press, New Delhi, pp. 1–33.
Wilkinson, E., 2012. Transforming Disaster Risk Management: A Political Economy
Approach. ODI Background Notes, January 2012.
Williams, G., 2011. Study on Disaster Risk Reduction, Decentralisation and Political
Economy, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR). <http://
www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/bgdocs/Williams_2011.
pdf> (accessed 04.07.14).
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davies, I., 2004. At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s
Vulnerability and Disasters. Taylor and Francis.
S. Jones et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 78–90 89
WMO, 2012. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Programme. World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO). <http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/drr/DRRFramework_
en.htm> (accessed 04.07.14).
World Bank, 2013a. Fragile States. <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:22230573~pagePK:64171531
menuPK:4448982piPK:64171507theSitePK:511778,00.html> (accessed 04.
07.14).
World Bank, 2013b. Harmonised List of Fragile Situations. <http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/511777-1269623894864/FCSHarmonized
ListFY13.pdf> (accessed 13.11.13).
Yogi, B., 2012. Role of state and non-state actors in Nepal’s Development. Readings
on Governance and Development, Vol XIV. Kathmandu: Institute for
Governance and Development.
90 S. Jones et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 78–90
